





Ju, Y.; Borm, P.E.M.
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ju, Y., & Borm, P. E. M. (2005). Externalities and Compensation: Primeval Games and Solutions. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-71). Microeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION: PRIMEVAL GAMES 
AND SOLUTIONS 
 
























Externalities and Compensation: Primeval Games and
Solutions1
Yuan Ju2 Peter Borm3
April 2005
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Abstract
The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent
studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper
focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture
the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic
framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules
for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and
the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are
provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied.
JEL classification codes: C71; D62; D63.
Keywords: externality; compensation; primeval games; marginalistic rule; concession
rule; primeval rule.
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the issue of externality and the associated compensation problem.
Externalities arise whenever an (economic) agent undertakes an action that has an effect
on another agent. When the effect turns out to be a cost imposed on the other agent(s),
it is called a negative externality. When agents benefit from an activity in which they are
not directly involved, the effect is called a positive externality. An associated fundamental
question in real life is how to compensate the losses incurred by the negative externalities.
Pigou (1920) suggests a solution that involves intervention by a regulator who imposes
a (Pigovian) tax. An alternative solution, known as the Coase theorem (Coase (1960)),
involves negotiation between the agents. Coase claims that if transactions costs are zero
and property rights are well defined, agents should be able to negotiate their way to an
efficient outcome. A third class of solutions, associated with Arrow (1970), involves setting
up a market for the externality. If a firm produces pollution that harms another firm, then
a competitive market for the right to pollute may allow for an efficient outcome. In this
framework, Varian (1994) designs the so-called compensation mechanisms for internalizing
externalities which encourage the firms to correctly reveal the costs they impose on the
other.
In fact, all solutions and approaches above try and solve the inefficiency problems aris-
ing from externalities, whereas they cannot be viewed as normative answers in terms of
fairness. In particular, the theories cannot answer a basic question like how much a house-
hold should be compensated by a polluting firm. Therefore, we are still in search of basic
normative solutions which might serve as benchmarks to determine adequate compensa-
tions in environments that are featured by externalities.
Solving an externality-incurred compensation problem boils down to recommending
rules or solutions for profit/cost sharing problems with externalities. A first model to solve
this problem was developed by Thrall and Lucas (1963) by the concept of partition function
form games : a partition function assigns a value to each pair consisting of a coalition and
a coalition structure which includes that coalition. Solution concepts for such games can
be found in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1986), Feldman (1994), Potter (2000), Pham Do and
Norde (2002), Maskin (2003), Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2004), and
Ju (2004a).
However, one may observe that the framework of partition function form games does
not model the externalities among individuals but restrict to specific coalitional effects.
The reason is simple: Partition function form games as well as cooperative games with
transferable utility (TU games) in characteristic function form always assume all the players
in the player set N are present even if they do not form a coalition. Consider a partition
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function form game and a player i in this game. What we know about the values with
respect to i has the following three cases only: complete breakdown, i.e. all the players
in this game do not cooperate with each other; partial cooperation, i.e. i participates in
some coalition or i stands alone while some other players cooperate; complete cooperation,
i.e. all the players form a grand coalition. In fact, the externalities among individual
players (inter-individual externalities) are “internalized” or “incorporated” from the very
beginning because there is no explicit distinction between the case when only one player
is in the game and the case when all appear.
The task attempted in this paper is essentially twofold. First, it takes players’ initial
situations (no other players, in an absolute stand-alone sense) into account and constructs
a new class of games, primeval games, which model the externalities among individual
players. Second, it discusses several compensation rules which can actually serve as specific
benchmarks to solve the compensation issue related to externality problems.
Primeval games have a flavor of TU games but are more like partition function form
games in structure. Two basic differences with respect to the classical cooperative games
are that primeval games do not consider cooperation, and primeval games take into account
all situations in which only a subgroup of players is present. In this way, all possible
externalities among players are modelled.
We introduce three compensation rules for primeval games: the marginalistic rule, a
modification of the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley (1953)), the concession rule, which
is in the same spirit as the consensus value for TU games (Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)),
and a more context-specific compensation rule, the primeval rule. The first two solution
concepts are axiomatically characterized. Properties of the primeval rule are discussed.
In addition to this section introducing the paper briefly, the remaining part has the
following structure. The next section presents a small example that motivates the approach
and the model. In section 3, we lay out the general model: primeval games. Section 4
defines three solution concepts for primeval games. Section 5 introduces unanimity games
for the class of primeval games, which facilitates the characterizations of the marginalistic
rule and the concession rule that are provided in the next section. Specific properties of the
primeval rule are studied and a comparison with the marginalistic rule and the concession
rule is provided for specific types of players in the final section.
2 An example: a village with three households
Consider three households, a, b, and c, living in the same village; or more generally, three
(economic) agents in a certain interactive environment.
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If all three households simultaneously live in the village, the utilities of a, b, and c are
given by 8, 2 and 2, respectively.
It is quite common that one household may generate positive or negative externalities
to the others. For instance, a’s utility may not only dependent on a himself, but may also
depend on the activities of b and c. That is, the realization of 8 is the outcome of every
household’s activities in the current structure. It could be higher or lower if some other
household were absent or would stop any possible activities that may generate externalities
to a.
Therefore, it is necessary and interesting to go “back” to see the “primeval” situations
of the current structure.
In the case that only household b lives in the village, or equivalently, in the case that
b comes into this village first while a and c are not present the utility for b would be 3
instead of 2. This case is described by the second column in the following table. E.g. the
fifth column represents the fact that when both a and c live in the village while b is not
present, a and c’s utilities would be 5 and 1, respectively. All the other possible cases are
provided as well.
(a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
(5) (3) (2) (8, 2) (5, 1) (3, 0) (8, 2, 2)
Here, from the externality point of view, one can easily see that a benefits while b loses.
Natural questions are: Should b be compensated? If so, by whom and how much?
3 The model: primeval games
To capture all the possibilities of inter-individual externalities and further discuss the
associated compensation problem, we now construct the formal model of primeval games.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the finite set of players. A subset S of N , in order to be
distinguished from the usual concept of coalition in cooperative games, is called a group
of individuals (in short, a group S). Here, the term of group should be understood as a
neutral concept, which has nothing to do with cooperation or anything else, but simply
means a set of individual players in N .
A pair (i, S) that consists of a player i and a group S of N to which i belongs is called
an embedded player in S. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded players, i.e.
E(N) = {(i, S) ∈ N × 2N |i ∈ S} .
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Definition 3.1 A mapping
u : E(N) −→ R
that assigns a real value u(i, S) to each embedded player (i, S) is an individual-group func-
tion. The ordered pair (N, u) is called a primeval game1. The set of primeval games with
player set N is denoted by PRIN .
The value u(i, S) represents the payoff, or utility, of player i, given that all players in
S are present while all players in N\S are absent. For a given group S and an individual-
group function u, let ū(S) denote the vector (u(i, S))i∈S. We call ū(N) the status quo of
a primeval game u, and u(i, {i}) the absolute stand-alone payoff, or the Rubinson Crusoe
payoff (in short, R-C payoff) of player i in game u.
Definition 3.2 A (compensation) rule on PRIN is a function f , which associates with
each primeval game (N, u) in PRIN a vector f(N, u) = (fi(N, u))i∈N ∈ RN of individual
payoffs.
4 Compensation rules
This section introduces several compensation rules for primeval games. Since it is assumed
that for any primeval game every player has the same right to enter it, there is no prede-
termined ordering of players. However, we need to take orders into account because they
help to clearify the relationship among players with respect to externalities. Therefore, we
consider all different orderings of players when determining compensations in the context
of externality.
4.1 The marginalistic rule
People generally believe that one should not do harm to the others, and otherwise, one
must provide compensation. Analogously, if a player’s activities impose a positive effect
on the others, then he has the right to ask them to pay for that. Meanwhile we might
adopt a practical principle known as first come, first served. That is, the player who comes
into a game first should be well protected: Any later entrant must compensate him if she
causes loss on him while he need not worry about any possible negative effects he could
impose on the later entrants, i.e., he has the right to assume no responsibility for his
1Since a primeval game models inter-individual externalities and aims to solve the associated compen-
sation problem, an alternative name would be individual externality-compensation game.
4
behavior, irrespective of what consequence it might cause on the others. Along the same
line of reasoning, the second entrant only cares about the first player but does not have any
responsibility for his successors whereas all his successors should take care of the first two
entrants’ payoffs. More specifically, given an ordering of players, the early entrants should
be well protected such that the losses due to negative externalities that possibly arise later
are compensated. Also, the gains from positive externalities should be transferred to whom
they are produced by. Those effects can be well captured by the so-called marginal values.
Thus, the corresponding rule is in fact a completely marginal treatment of externalities.
The formal definition is provided as follows. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , let
Π(N) be the set of all bijections σ : {1, 2, ..., |N |} −→ N . For a given σ ∈ Π(N) and
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |} we define Sσk = {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k)} and Sσ0 = ∅.
We construct the marginal vector mσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where the
players enter the game one by one in the order σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(|N |) and where each player






u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) if k = 1




u(σ(j), Sσk )− u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
)
if k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}.
Therefore, player σ(k) might be involved in four kinds of compensating behavior or circum-
stances: compensating the incumbents if he produces negative externalities on them, being
compensated from the incumbents if they benefit from his showing up (i.e., he produces
positive externalities on the incumbents), being compensated by the later entrants if they
impose negative externalities on him; paying compensation to the later entrants if they
generate positive externalities on him.







for all t ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.
Furthermore, since no predetermined ordering of players exists, we take all possible
permutations into consideration. Thus, the marginalistic rule Φ(u) is defined as the average







Note that the marginalitic rule for primeval games is in the same spirit of the Shapley
value for TU games.
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Example 4.1 Consider the three-household village example.
With σ : {1, 2, 3} −→ N defined by σ(1) = b, σ(2) = a and σ(3) = c, which is shortly
denoted by σ = (b a c), we get
mσb (u)(= m
σ
σ(1)(u)) = u(b, {b}) = 3,
mσa(u)(= m
σ
σ(2)(u)) = u(a, {a, b}) + u(b, {a, b})− u(b, {b}) = 8 + 2− 3 = 7,
mσc (u)(= m
σ
σ(3)(u)) = u(c, {a, b, c}) + u(b, {a, b, c}) + u(a, {a, b, c})
− u(b, {a, b})− u(a, {a, b})
= 2 + 2 + 8− 2− 8 = 2.






(a b c) 5 5 2
(a c b) 5 6 1
(b a c) 7 3 2
(b c a) 9 3 0
(c a b) 4 6 2
(c b a) 9 1 2







. Thus, to compensate for externalities, a needs to pay
11
2
to b, and c will pay 1
2
to b.
4.2 The concession rule
One might oppose the “first come, first served” idea and rather prefer an equal responsi-
bility based rule: From the bilateral point of view, both parties (the incumbents and the
entrant) should be equally responsible for an externality due to the showing up of the new
entrant. Take the village example. Suppose player b comes first and player a follows. In
this case we observe that b is negatively affected. One may argue that not only a but also
b should account for the loss of 1 because it is the outcome of the joint effect between
a’s activities and b’s feelings. An alternative argument could be that the households have
the rights of living in the village and equally enjoy the rights to produce externalities,
irrespective of the timing about entering the village. Then, a 50-50 rule seems suitable.
This point of view is reflected in the definition of the concession rule below.
In order to define the concession rule for primeval games, we construct the concession
vector Cσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where players enter the game u one by
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one in an order σ ∈ Π(N) and where every new entrant, say σ(k), first obtains the payoff
when entering, u(σ(k), Sσk ), and then equally shares with every incumbent her surplus/loss
incurred by the corresponding positive/negative externality imposed by him, and also
equally shares his surplus/loss with all his successors. The word of concession is used here
because players concede to each other and make a compromise on assuming responsibilities
of the externalities.





u(σ(j), Sσk )− u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
2




u(σ(k), Sσl )− u(σ(k), Sσl−1)
2
.
Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very first place, he has no concession
payoff for the externalities on previous players. Therefore Pσσ(1)(u) = 0. Correspondingly,
when a player enters a game in the very last place, there is no subsequent externality for
him. Hence, Sσσ(|N |)(u) = 0.
Moreover, the concession payoff from the subsequent externalities for player σ(k) can
be simplified as
Sσσ(k)(u) =
u(σ(k), N)− u(σ(k), Sσk )
2
for all k = {1, ..., |N | − 1}.





u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) + Sσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(σ(k), Sσk ) + Pσσ(k)(u) + Sσσ(k)(u) if k = {2, ..., |N | − 1}













if k = {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(σ(|N |), N) + Pσσ(|N |)(u) if k = |N |.
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for t ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}.
The concession rule C(u) is defined as the average of the concession vectors, i.e.,




Note that the concession rule for primeval games is in the same spirit as the consensus
value for TU games (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)).
Example 4.2 Consider the three-household village example.
With σ = (b a c), which is a shorthand notation as in Example 4.1, we get
Cσb (u) =










u(b, {b, a})− u(b, {b})
2
+












Cσc (u) = u(c, {b, a, c}) +
(u(b, {b, a, c})− u(b, {b, a})) + (u(a, {b, a, c})− u(a, {b, a}))
2
= 2.
Similarly, all concession vectors are given by
























(c a b) 6 4 2










. Thus, to compensate for externalities, a needs to pay
3
4
to b, and c will pay 1
4
to b. Compared to the outcome of the marginalistic rule, both a
and c give less compensation to b.
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Theorem 4.3 The outcome prescribed by the concession rule turns out to be the average
of the status quo payoff vector and the outcome of the marginalitic rule. For any game







for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Given a game u ∈ PRIN and σ ∈ Π(N), let i = σ(k), where k ∈ {1, 2, ...|N |}.
By definition, we know for k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}



































Moreover, this equality is obvious for the cases that k = 1 or |N |. Hence, Ci(u) =
1
2
u(i, N) + 1
2
Φi(u).
4.3 The primeval rule
We now propose an alternative rule, the basic idea of which is that the losses due to negative
externalities should be compensated whereas the benefits from the positive externalities
are enjoyed for free. This somehow is a general and natural attitude when people face
externalities in reality. Thus, the rule based on this idea might be easy to be accepted and
implemented in practice.
The corresponding rule could be described as the chargeable negative externalities and
free positive externalities rule. For shorthand we call it the primeval rule.
For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and an ordering σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |},
we construct the primeval vector Bσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where the
players enter the game one by one in the order σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(|N |) and where each player
σ(k) compensates the losses of his predecessors but enjoys positive externalities from his
successors freely.






u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk ), 0
}
9






u(σ(k), Sσl )− u(σ(k), Sσl−1), 0
}
.
Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very first place, he assumes no
responsibility for the others. Therefore, Lσσ(1)(u) = 0. Similarly, when a player enters a
game in the very last place, he cannot enjoy any subsequent positive externalities. Hence,
Gσσ(|N |)(u) = 0.





u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) + Gσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(σ(k), Sσk )− Lσσ(k)(u) + Gσσ(k)(u) if k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(σ(|N |), N)− Lσσ(|N |)(u) if k = |N |.
Similar to the concession rule, here one can check that for a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and














for t ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}.







Example 4.4 Consider the three-household village example.
With σ = (b a c), we get
Bσb (u) = u(b, {b}) = 3,
Bσa (u) = u(a, {b, a})− (u(b, {b})− u(b, {b, a}) = 8− (3− 2) = 7,
Bσc (u) = u(c, {b, a, c}) = 2.
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Similarly, all primeval vectors are given by





(a b c) 8 2 2
(a c b) 8 2 2
(b a c) 7 3 2
(b c a) 7 3 2
(c a b) 7 2 3
(c b a) 7 1 4









. Thus, to compensate for externalities, a needs to pay
1
6
to b and 1
2
to c. Note that in this case c even becomes a compensation receiver instead
of a provider like in the previous two cases. This is due to the underlying assumption that
all positive externalities are for free.
5 Unanimity games
This section introduces unanimity games for the class of primeval games as a generalization
of unanimity games for the class of TU games. Every primeval game can be written in a
unique way as a linear combination of unanimity games.
Recall that the unanimity games {(N, uT )|T ∈ 2N\{∅}} form a basis for the class of all
TU games with player set N . Below we will define unanimity games for primeval games.
Definition 5.1 Let (j, T ) ∈ E(N) be an embedded player. The unanimity game w(j,T ),
corresponding to (j, T ), is given by




1, if j = i and T ⊂ S
0, otherwise
for every (i, S) ∈ E(N).
Example 5.2 Consider the three-household village game and denote the player set with
N = {1, 2, 3} instead of {a, b, c}. The following table gives the values of w(j,T )(i, S) for all
embedded players (j, T ) and (i, S).
For saving space, we use the following notations. τ1 = (1, {1}), τ2 = (2, {2}), τ3 =
(3, {3}), τ4 = (1, {1, 2}), τ5 = (2, {1, 2}), τ6 = (1, {1, 3}), τ7 = (3, {1, 3}), τ8 = (2, {2, 3}),
τ9 = (3, {2, 3}), τ10 = (1, {1, 2, 3}), τ11 = (2, {1, 2, 3}), τ12 = (3, {1, 2, 3}).
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(i, S)\(j, T ) τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 τ5 τ6 τ7 τ8 τ9 τ10 τ11 τ12
τ1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ6 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
τ8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
τ9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
τ10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
τ11 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
τ12 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
One can prove, similar to the case of TU games, that the unanimity games form a basis
for the class of primeval games (cf. Ju (2004b, p.100-101, Lemma 5.5.3)). This means
that if (N, u) is a primeval game, then there exist uniquely determined real numbers d(j,T ),
(j, T ) ∈ E(N), such that u = ∑(j,T )∈E(N) d(j,T )w(j,T ).
The following example shows the linear expansion of a primeval game (N, u) with
respect to the unanimity games w(j,T ).
Example 5.3 Consider the primeval game (N, u) in the three-household village example.
The decomposition of u is given by
u = 5w(1,{1}) + 3w(2,{2}) + 2w(3,{3}) + 3w(1,{1,2}) − w(2,{1,2}) − w(3,{1,3}) − 2w(3,{2,3})
+ 3w(3,{1,2,3}).
6 Properties and characterizations
This section discusses possible properties of a compensation rule for primeval games. We
then provide characterizations using those properties.
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As the status quo of a primeval game always exists (in fact, it is the only situation
that happens in reality), we require the efficiency (or balanced-budget) property for a
compensation rule: the sum of all the players’ values according to the rule equals the sum
of their status quo payoffs.
• Property 1 (Efficiency): ∑i∈N fi(u) =
∑
i∈N u(i, N) for all u ∈ PRIN .
A second property is symmetry. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we say that two
players i, j ∈ N are symmetric if for all S ⊂ N\{i, j},
u(i, S ∪ {i}) +
∑
k∈S
u(k, S ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j}) +
∑
k∈S
u(k, S ∪ {j}).
It implies that in terms of total payoffs, the showing up of i has the same effect as that of
j for any group of players without i and j.
• Property 2 (Symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all symmetric
players i, j in (N, u).
We now turn to a third property, which focuses on the externality side of a primeval
game.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an immune player if u(i, S) = u(i, {i})
for all S ⊂ N and i ∈ S. Thus, an immune player is a player who is not affected by the
presence of the others.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an uninfluential player if u(j, S ∪
{i}) = u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, an uninfluential player is a player who
never affects another player.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a neutral player if it is both an
immune player and an uninfluential player in (N, u).
• Property 3 (The neutral player property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈ PRIN and for
any neutral player i in (N, u).
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a dummy if
∑
j∈S
u(j, S ∪ {i}) + u(i, S ∪ {i}) =
∑
j∈S
u(j, S) + u(i, {i})
for all S ⊂ N\{i}.
• Property 4 (The dummy property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈ PRIN and for any
dummy player i in (N, u).
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We now introduce the following property.
• Property 5 (Additivity): f(u1 + u2) = f(u1) + f(u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ PRIN , where
u1 + u2 is defined by (u1 + u2)(i, S) = u1(i, S) + u2(i, S) for every (i, S) ∈ E(N).
Theorem 6.1 The marginalistic rule satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the neutral player
property, the dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
(i) Efficiency: Clearly, by construction, mσ(u) is efficient for all σ ∈ Π(N).
(ii) Symmetry: Let i1, i2 be two symmetric players in u ∈ PRIN . Consider σ ∈ Π(N), and
without loss of generality, σ(k) = i1, σ(h) = i2, where i1, i2 ∈ N . Let σ̄ ∈ Π(N) be the





σ(w) if w 6= k, h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k.
As σ 7→ σ̄ is bijective, it suffices to prove that mσi1(u) = mσ̄i2(u).
Case 1: 1 < k < h.



















Obviously, u(σ(j), Sσk−1) = u(σ̄(j), S
σ̄











Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.
Case 3: 1 = k < h. Apparently,
mσi1(u) = m
σ
σ(1)(u) = u(i1, {i1}) = u(i2, {i2}) = mσ̄σ̄(1)(u) = mσ̄i2(u).
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.




(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N, u) then mσi (u) =
u(i, {i}) for any σ ∈ Π(N).
(iv) The dummy property: Obvious.






u1, u2 ∈ PRIN and for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |}.
As the following example shows, the concession rule and the primeval rule do not satisfy
the dummy property.
Example 6.2 Here, the three-household village game is manipulated into a new primeval
games (N, u1) with N = {a, b, c} such that player c is a dummy in the game u1.
(a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u1 (5) (3) (2) (8, 2) (3, 4) (4, 1) (6, 0, 6)
The solutions for the above game are given as follows.
Φ(u1) = (6, 4, 2)







Theorem 6.3 There is a unique compensation rule on PRIN satisfying efficiency, sym-
metry, the dummy property and additivity. This rule is the marginalistic rule.
Proof. From Theorem 6.1, it follows that the marginalistic rule Φ satisfies efficiency,
symmetry, the dummy property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose that a compensation rule f satisfies these four properties. We have





where d(j,T ) is uniquely determined.








Thus, it suffices to show that for all (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R we have f(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
Φ(d(j,T )w(j,T )).
Let (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R. For any i /∈ T , one readily verifies that i is a dummy
player of game (N, d(j,T )w(j,T )). Therefore, by the dummy property,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = Φi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = 0 for all i /∈ T. (1)
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Then, for players i, k ∈ T , we can easily see that i and k are symmetric player in
(N, d(j,T )w(j,T )). By symmetry,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = fk(d(j,T )w(j,T )) for all i, k ∈ T ; (2)
and similarly,
Φi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = Φk(d(j,T )w(j,T )) for all i, k ∈ T. (3)
Therefore, efficiency and (1)-(3) imply that
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = Φi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
1
|T |d(j,T ) for all i ∈ T.
Consider the dummy property which takes a marginal contribution perspective and
assigns a dummy player his R-C payoff. As we know, without taking compensation into
account, a dummy player i will get his status quo payoff in game u, i.e., u(i, N). As u(i, {i})
and u(i, N) represent two polar opinions, one may argue that taking the average could be
a fair compromise.
• Property 6 (The quasi dummy property): fi(u) = u(i,{i})+u(i,N)2 , for all u ∈ PRIN and
for any dummy player i in (N, u).
Now we introduce the property of adjusted symmetry. Similar to the quasi dummy
property, one may have the following argument. On the one hand, when considering the
same effect on total payoffs that symmetric players have, they may require the same value
in a game. On the other hand, since symmetric players can have different R-C payoffs or
status quo payoffs, their values should reflect such differences. An immediate and easy way
to deal with this problem is to adjust the values by their status quo payoffs.
• Property 7 (Adjusted symmetry): There is an α(u) ∈ R such that
fi(u) =





for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all symmetric players i, j in u, where α(u) is called the
standard value for symmetric players in u.
Theorem 6.4 The concession rule satisfies efficiency, adjusted symmetry, the neutral
player property, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
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Proof.
(i) Efficiency: Clearly, by construction, Cσ(u) is efficient for all σ ∈ Π(N).
(ii) Adjusted symmetry: By Theorem 4.3, the proof is readily established.
(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N, u) then Cσi (u) =
u(i, {i}) for any σ ∈ Π(N).
(iv) The quasi dummy property: Given a game u ∈ PRIN and σ ∈ Π(N), let player i
be a dummy player in u and i = σ(k). By definition, one can readily check that for all












(u(i, {i})− u(i, Sσk )) .
Then, by the definition of the concession vector, we know
Cσσ(k)(u) =
u(i, {i}) + u(i, N)
2
for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |}.
Hence, what remains is obvious.
(v) Additivity: It is immediate, by definition, to see that Cσσ(k)(u1 + u2) = C
σ
σ(k)(u1) +
Cσσ(k)(u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ PRIN and for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |}.
Theorem 6.5 There is a unique compensation rule on PRIN satisfying efficiency, ad-
justed symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. This rule is the concession
rule.
Proof. From Theorem 6.4, it follows that the concession rule C satisfies efficiency, adjusted
symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose a compensation rule f satisfies these four properties. We have to





where d(j,T ) is uniquely determined.









Thus, it suffices to show that for all (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R we have f(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
C(d(j,T )w(j,T )).
Let (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R. For any i /∈ T , one readily verifies that i is a dummy
player of game (N, d(j,T )w(j,T )). Therefore, by the quasi dummy property,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = Ci(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = 0 for all i /∈ T. (4)
Moreover, we know that all players in group T are symmetric players in (N, d(j,T )w(j,T )).
By adjusted symmetry,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αf
2
for all i ∈ T\{j} and some αf ∈ R, (5)
and
Ci(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = αC
2
for all i ∈ T\{j} and some αC ∈ R. (6)
And for player j, by adjusted symmetry as well, we have
fj(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αf + d(j,T )
2
and Cj(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αC + d(j,T )
2
. (7)
Thus, efficiency and (4)-(7) imply that
αf = αC =
1
|T |d(j,T ).
Before introducing the next property, we first define completely symmetric players.
Given a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we say that two players i, j ∈ N are completely
symmetric if for all S ⊂ N\{i, j},
u(i, S ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j}) and u(i, S ∪ {j} ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j} ∪ {i})
and for all k ∈ S
u(k, S ∪ {i}) = u(k, S ∪ {j}).
It is natural to require that two complete symmetric players get the same value in
a primeval game as their emergences generate the same influence to other players while
getting the same influence from the emergences of the others.
• Property 8 (Complete symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all
completely symmetric players i, j ∈ N .
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Obviously, from the stronger versions of symmetry considered before, it readily follows
that the marginalisitic rule and the concession rule satisfy complete symmetry.
Now we discuss another property which pays more attention to the compensation aspect
and therefore seems important in the context of primeval games.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a harmful player if u(j, S ∪ {i}) ≤
u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, a harmful player is a player who never generates
positive externalities to other players.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a harmless player if u(j, S ∪ {i}) ≥
u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, a harmless player is a player who never
produces negative externalities to others.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an immune-harmful player if it is
both an immune player and a harmful player in u; or is called an immune-harmless player
if it is both an immune player and a harmless player in u.
• Property 9 (The immune-harmless player property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈
PRIN and for any immune-harmless player i in (N, u).
Theorem 6.6 The primeval rule satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the neutral player
property and the immune-harmless player property.
Proof.
(i) Efficiency: Clearly, by construction, Bσ(u) is efficient for all σ ∈ Π(N).
(ii) Complete symmetry: Let i1, i2 be two completely symmetric players in u ∈ PRIN .
Consider σ ∈ Π(N), and without loss of generality, σ(k) = i1, σ(h) = i2, where i1, i2 ∈ N .
Let σ̄ ∈ Π(N) be the permutation which is obtained from σ by interchanging the positions





σ(w) if w 6= k, h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k.
As σ 7→ σ̄ is bijective, it suffices to prove that Bσi1(u) = Bσ̄i2(u).
Case 1: 1 < k < h.
By definition, we know
Bσi1(u) = B
σ
σ(k)(u) = u(σ(k), S
σ
k )− Lσσ(k)(u) + Gσσ(k)(u)
Bσ̄i2(u) = B
σ̄
σ̄(k)(u) = u(σ̄(k), S
σ̄
k )− Lσ̄σ̄(k)(u) + Gσ̄σ̄(k)(u).
Obviously, u(σ(k), Sσk ) = u(σ̄(k), S
σ̄
k ). Moreover, since i1, i2 are completely symmetric











Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.
Case 3: 1 = k < h. Apparently,
Bσi1(u) = u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) + Gσσ(1)(u) = u(σ̄(1), {σ̄(1)}) + Gσ̄σ̄(1)(u) = Bσ̄σ̄(1)(u) = Bσ̄i2(u).
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.




(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N, u) then Bσi (u) =
u(i, {i}) for any σ ∈ Π(N).
(iv) The immune-harmless player property: Obvious.
The following example shows that the primeval rule does not satisfy symmetry and
additivity.
Example 6.7 Consider the following two primeval games.
(a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u1 (1) (1) (5) (2, 3) (2, 4) (0, 6) (3, 4, 2)
u2 (6) (4) (7) (10, 5) (7, 6) (3, 6) (11, 6, 4)









The game u2 is obtained by adding u1 to the three-household village game. The primeval









, which is not equal to the sum of the outcomes of the
primeval rule applied in game u1 and the three-household village game.
By investigating the gains of specific types of players under different compensation
rules, we can see the relationships and differences among those rules.
We first consider the following corollary which discusses the gains of an uninfluential
player according to the primeval rule and the marginalistic rule. The result is consistent
with our intuition: As an uninfluential player, he need not compensate the others while
he could benefit from the positive externalities from the others. So, for an uninfluential
player, the outcome of the primeval rule is always no less than that of the marginalistic
rule for a primeval game.
Corollary 6.8 For any game u ∈ PRIN and any uninfluential player i ∈ N , it holds that
ζi(u) ≥ Φi(u).
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Proof. Given a game u ∈ PRIN and let i ∈ N be an uninfluential player. Given σ ∈ Π(N),
let i = σ(k), it suffice to show Bσi (u) ≥ mσi (u). As we know






u(i, {i}) + Gσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(i, Sσk ) + G
σ
σ(k)(u) if k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(i, N) if k = |N |
and
mσi (u) = m
σ
σ(k)(u) = u(i, S
σ
k ).
So, Bσi (u) ≥ mσi (u).
We would like to note that there is no general relationship between the concession rule
and the other two rules with respect to uninfluential players.
For an immune-harmful player, since he cannot get any positive externalities but needs
to compensate the others as he always does harm to them, the outcome of the primeval
rule is equivalent to that of the marginalistic rule. An immune-harmless player may be
expected to obtain his R-C payoff: He need not compensate the others because he does
not do anything harmful. Meanwhile, he need not be compensated because nobody affects
him. The primeval rule is consistent with this idea while the marginalistic rule and the
concession rule may give extra payoff to such a player as they take a different perspective
such that the positive externalities are not for free.
Corollary 6.9 For any game u ∈ PRIN , we have
(a) Φi(u) = ζi(u) ≤ Ci(u) ≤ u(i, {i}) for any immune-harmful player i ∈ N ; and
(b) Φi(u) ≥ Ci(u) ≥ ζi(u) = u(i, {i}) for any immune-harmless player i ∈ N .
Proof.
(a) Given σ ∈ Π(N) and let i = σ(k) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |}. First, in order to prove
Φi(u) = ζi(u), it suffices to show m
σ
i (u) = B
σ






























u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk )
) ≥ 0, we know mσi (u) = Bσi (u) ≤
















(b) By definition and analogous to part (a), the proof is easy to be established.
Corollary 6.10 For any game u ∈ PRIN and any harmless player i ∈ N with u(i, N) ≥
u(i, {i}), it holds that
ζi(u) ≥ u(i, {i}).
Proof. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , let i be a harmless player in u. For an ordering
σ ∈ Π(N), let i = σ(k), k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. By definition and since u(i, N) ≥ u(i, {i}), we
know Gσi (u) ≥ 0 if k = 1; Lσi (u) = 0 for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}; and
u(i, Sσk ) + G
σ
i (u) ≥ u(i, N) ≥ u(i, {i})
for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}. Hence, Bσi (u) ≥ u(i, {i}).
Note that Corollary 6.10 can be understood as the property of individual rationality
for harmless players: If a player’s presence never does harm to others and his status quo
payoff is greater than his R-C payoff, he should get at least his R-C payoff.
As the following example shows, the marginalistic rule and the concession rule do not
satisfy this property.
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Example 6.11 Consider the following game u with three players, a, b and c.
(a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
(3) (1) (5) (0, 1) (0, 5) (0, 6) (3, 1, 6)




to the concession rule, Ca(u) = 223 . Both are less than a’s R-C payoff of 3. However, the
primeval rule yields that ζa(u) = 4.
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